Disarray in the NDP: what should happen next?

The mass resignation of five high ranking cabinet ministers that forced NDP Premier Greg Selinger to appoint a new cabinet is unprecedented in Manitoba political history.

• LISTEN:Political Scientist Paul Thomas on Premier Selinger's Political Troubles

Significantly, the resignations of as few as one or two key ministers have recently forced premiers in other provinces to consider their political future, and most of them have eventually stepped aside. Premier Selinger has chosen to carry on.

The deep divisions within the cabinet and caucus will impair the functioning of government and will do severe damage to the political future of the NDP, which has come to see itself as the natural governing party that wins more often than it loses.

Prime ministerial governing

In terms of the governing process, open challenges to premiers and their forced exit appear to contradict the conventional wisdom that cabinet-parliamentary government has been transformed over time into a form of one-person rule called prime ministerial government, in which the leader of a governing party can use the prerogatives of office to set policy unilaterally and to block threats to her/his leadership.

Prime ministerial rule is usually contrasted with a traditionalcollegialmodel of collective cabinet decision-making influenced by the opinions of backbenchMLAsexpressed in the regular, confidential meetings of the party caucus.

This dichotomy between two models of government decision-making is simplistic and false. Interpretation of theSelingercase suggests that reality is more complicated.

3 short years andopen revolt

After taking over from Gary Doer and becoming premier in November of 2009, Selinger led the NDP to its fourth consecutive majority government in 2011, capturing 37 of the 57 seats in the Manitoba Legislature its highest seat count ever.

How could it happen that within three short years there was open revolt in the cabinet and the caucus?

According to the prime ministerial government theory, political success, combined with the prerogatives of office, like the appointment and dismissal of ministers, as well as the usual incentives and pressures that drive party unity, supposedly make premiers invincible.

It is difficult for outsiders to understand the changing internal dynamics of cabinet and caucus. Cabinet is the most interesting part of the governing process, but it is also the most secretive part. Based on the law and long-standing unwritten conventions, cabinet confidentiality and solidarity are meant to prevail.

• Majority of Manitobans want Premier Selinger to resign, poll shows

Confidentiality is meant to promote frank, vigorous debates and to prevent political opponents from taking advantage of the inevitable internal disagreements on some issues. Once ministers have had their say behind closed doors, they are expected to support the decisions of cabinet on both the substance of policy and on the strategy for mobilizing public support for those decisions.

Generally votes are not taken in cabinet; instead it is left to the premier to determine whether a consensus exists and what actions should follow. These norms of behaviour apply to a lesser extent to the proceedings of the caucus of the governing party.

Priority, planning

After winning a fourth term, Selinger re-established in January 2012 the Priorities and Planning (P+P) Committee of cabinet as an inner group to set the overall policy direction of government and to achieve coordination of policy across departmental boundaries.

There were other cabinet committees for broad policy sectors. In addition, a number of caucus subcommittees in different policy fields were created and ministers were expected to consult these bodies to obtain policy ideas. All of these structures and procedures seemed to imply a collegial approach to governing, not one based on top-down command and control from the premiers office.

However, based on the public complaints of the five departed ministers, four of whom served on the P+P committee, the premier grew less and less willing to accept advice. The five departed ministers claim that even before the political crisis broke wide open, the P+P committee had stopped working as a collective decision-making body.

The premiers unilateral action on the PST increase was the most dramatic episode, but on other politically sensitive issues there was seen to be a lack of responsiveness to the opinions of key cabinet ministers.

There have also been public complaints that the caucus was not kept informed and its opinion was not sought on important developments. An early warning signal of caucus unrest was the fact that its policy subcommittees stopped meeting. Instead an all- backbencher committee of caucus (with no ministers included) was created, and eventually that committee produced a document called a Backbench Manifesto.

The manifesto set forth a series of substantive and process concerns. The premier politely accepted the document, but his critics allege that he did not change his unilateral leadership style.

Social psych > formal structure

My research over several decades on the political management of cabinet and caucus has led me to conclude that social psychology of a group process is more important than the formal structures and procedures.

There needs to be a culture and climate of shared purpose, inclusiveness, belonging, respect, mutual understanding and, most importantly trust, in order for quality decision-making to occur and for party solidarity to be maintained. Bonds of trust are slow to develop and once broken are difficult to repair.

The premier is the single most important actor in the process of achieving cohesion within cabinet and caucus. His character, personality, leadership style and decisions are crucial to the maintenance of a unified cabinet and caucus.

Even with his extensive prerogatives, the premier needs to work through and with others in order to achieve his governing and political goals. In some circumstances, retaining the confidence of cabinet and caucus requires the premier to act with authority and decisiveness to exercise so-called hard power.

Most of the time, however, the political management of cabinet and caucus is best achieved by the skillful use of carrots and sticks, by anticipating the reaction of cabinet and caucus, by a willingness sometimes to compromise and even at times being prepared to back down.

In other words, contextual intelligence and soft power are the most effective and enduring bases for successful leadership.

(Not) business as usual

It is not business as usual in the Government of Manitoba today.

The levels of inter-personal confidence and trust needed for vigorous internal debate is missing. The current conditions will impair the governing process because there will be less willingness to speak candidly for fear that ones motives will be suspect.

It is also obvious that in political terms, grave damage has already been done to the NDP brand. There is the very real possibility that the party could slip to third place after the next election which will likely occur in April 2016.

Some wise, respected, credible person in the NDP camp needs to come forward as the champion of a plan to achieve some greater semblance of party unity. This would involve in the first instance the call for an early leadership review.

The review could be done through a vote by representatives of constituency associations. Premier Selinger should encourage this as a basis for partially restoring his credibility and legitimacy as a leader.

He should not make the mistake of setting the bar too high for such a confidence vote. Support in the range of the mid-50s would be adequate. If he fails to gain such support, a hastily orchestrated leadership contest would have to be called.

How to deal in a time of crisis

Longer term, there is a need for the NDP, like all parties, to clarify the rules for dealing with a crisis inside the parliamentary wing of the party. There is no provision for votes in cabinet or caucus to remove a premier. Until early in the 20th century, party leaders were chosen by caucus, but eventually all parties went to the election of leaders by conventions of voting delegates.

To lessen the potential for one-person rule, some reformers have suggested returning to caucus selection and removal. This is not going to happen neither party leaders nor party members will accept the idea.

A more reasonable, politically feasible idea would be a rule allowing a majority of caucus, or even a substantial minority, to trigger a leadership review.

In the end, cabinet and caucus are very human institutions and they rely greatly on credible, trustworthy leadership.

Paul Thomas is professor emeritus in political studies at the University of Manitoba.