CSIS flags issues with U.S. intelligence prior to Jan. 6 riot, says it faces the same problems

American intelligence agencies struggled with "inconsistencies" in their analysis and "a lack of consensus" on the natureof the threat in the weeks prior to the Jan. 6, 2021 riot on Capitol Hill, says an internalCanadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)report.

That July 2021 briefing note obtained by CBC News throughan access to information request also says that asCSIS pursues the threat of ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE) in Canada, it's dealing withmany of the same challenges its U.S. counterpartsfacedprior to the riot.

The July 2021 briefing note includes summaries drafted by CSIS officials of the U.S. Senate'sreport on the attack on Capitol Hill on Jan. 6, 2021 and the U.S. national strategy for countering domestic terrorism.

The report also includes CSIS's observations on the event, which were meant to be shared with senior officials in the public safety, defence, immigration and justice departments.

Reacting to reports from the FBI and theU.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to American lawmakers, CSIS said there were "inconsistencies between and within intelligence products that led to a lack of consensus about the gravity of the threat posed on January 6."

The CSIS summaries flagged problems the FBI and the DHSexperienced in trying to prepare for what became an assault on the Capitol by a mob of outgoing president Donald Trump's supporters.

CSIS said those problems included discerning the intent of potential threat actors, distinguishingprotected free speech from credible threats of violence, obtaining lawfulaccess toprivate or closed social media platforms and gaining access to encrypted channels used by IMVEindividualsthreatening violence.

"CSIS faces many of the same investigative challenges as its American counterparts in this space," saysthe document.

"These considerations reinforce the importance of CSIS's efforts to modernize and maximize its authorities, as part of Canadian and allied efforts to counter violent extremism."

CSIS defines IMVE as extremismmotivated by "a range of grievances and ideas from across the traditional ideological spectrum."

"The resulting worldview consists of a personalized narrative which centres on an extremist's willingness to incite, enable and/or mobilize to violence," says the CSISwebsite.

The challenges raised in the briefing note have one national security expertquestioninghow seriously the intelligence community and lawenforcement took the Freedom Convoyevent before protesters opposed to vaccine mandates occupied downtown Ottawa for weeks in February.

"Where they seem to have fallen down in the U.S. seems to be the contradictory and inconsistent advice,"saidStephanie Carvin, a former federal government national security analyst who now teaches at Carleton University.

"I don't know about CSIS but was that a community problem we had here in Canada that some agencies recognized and some didn't, and was [the Ottawa Police Service]getting consistent advice? That wouldbe something I'd be interested in knowing."

Gaps in intelligence-sharing

What the spy agency saw and passed on to police, and how police responded to that information, arelikely to come in for close scrutiny through the recently announced public inquiry and special joint committee looking into the federal government's decision to invokethe Emergencies Act to clear the convoy occupation.

The 2021 briefing noteflags oneangle the inquiry and the committee might want to examine:ongoing gaps in intelligence-sharingbetween CSIS andthe police.

"CSIS continues to wrestle with the challenges of sharing classified intelligence to inform law enforcement action, while protecting against injurious disclosure," saysthe briefing note.

Carvin said the real question might be whether authorities failed to turn CSIS'swarnings and advice into action.

"It seems fairly clear that our intelligence services did seem to understand what was coming. That's the major difference I think between [the] convoy and January 6," she said.

"It seems that the service was briefing downtown before this happened, so why did that intelligence not turn into better preparation and advice?"

A spokesperson for CSISsaid they cannotconfirm or deny the specifics of its investigations, operational interests, methodologies or activities.

"With that said, I would like to emphasize is that the definition of threats, as outlined in theCSIS Act, specifically excludes lawful protest and dissent,"said Brandon Champagne.

"CSIS works closely with its security and intelligence partners, including by sharing the necessary information with law enforcement to ensure public safety."

In the briefing note, CSIS says that, in order to better monitor IMVE, it'sseeking an update to theCanadian Security Intelligence Service Act.

"To fulfil our mandate of investigating IMVE, advising government and taking measures to reduce the threat, CSIS must have the tools to identify and disrupt threat actors within this data-rich and fast-paced threat environment, while meeting Canadians' expectations of privacy," says the document.

Chris Parsons, senior research associate at the University of Toronto's Citizen Lab, said it's almost impossible to determinewhether CSIS has adequate powers now, orhow it's deploying them.

"I don't think that CSIS is sufficiently transparent for us to know the answer to that," he said.

"But I think that there should be a culture of when we provide these powers to national security, and law enforcement agents as well, they should be required to provide some kind of an annual report as to how they're using them and the efficacy of their use."

He also said he wonderswhy CSIS didn't raise concerns aboutinvestigatingideologically motivated violent extremism when the government passed updated national security legislation in 2019.

"That's a little shocking, given that it suggests that CSIS didn't understand what it wanted, or ultimately it decided it wanted to take the first bite at the apple and then take another bite," he said.

Earlier this week, CSIS director David Vigneault told a committee of MPs and senators his resources are increasingly going to investigateIMVE.

"We are constantly looking at the movement of ideologically motivated violent extremists so we have a fairly good understanding of the dynamics at play," he said.

Sharing information with banks

The CSIS officials who wrote the briefing note also said the section of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Actthat prevents it from sharing classified threat information with non-government partners is underminingits work.

"... Section 19 of the CSIS Act prevents CSIS from sharing classified threat information with non-government partners, including financial institutions, which poses challenges in how the Service can support efforts to curb terrorist financing," says the briefing note.

Parsons said there's a risk of CSIS inappropriately classifying people as terrorists, or claiming they engage in activities counter to Canadian interests, and then passing that information on to banks and other institutions.

"This might be one thing if you're going to be hunting down people who are going to drive to the prime minister's home and try and shoot him. But there's a whole lot of other groups that have been on the receiving end of CSIS's attention that probably don't deserve it, or certainly don't believe they do," he said.

Outside of cracking open its legislation, there are a number of policy changes that could change how CSISresponds to IMVE.

In the briefing note, CSIS says it's also watching the ongoing CLOUD Act negotiations between Ottawa and the United States. The U.S. legislation allows law enforcement to compel U.S.-based technology companies (through a warrant or subpoena) to producerequested data stored on their servers regardless of whether the data are stored in the U.S. or on foreign soil.

If Canada signed on, CSIS could in theory get faster access to data held by Google, Apple, Facebook and other major online players.

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The agency also said that it's closely following the government's efforts to pass online harm legislation that could require regulated online entities likeFacebook, Instagram, Twitterand TikTokto flag content posingnational security concerns to CSIS.

"CSIS will continue working with Government of Canada partners on government policy initiatives and seize every opportunity to bolster the toolkit to respond to this dynamic threat," says the briefing note.

Carvin said Canada, like some of its allies,should be regularly updating the powers and authoritygiven tosecurity agencies like CSIS to keep themin line with both emerging technologiesand privacy concerns.

"How do we want our security services engaging online? Because I think if you ask most Canadians, 'Do you just want CSIS randomly surfing the internet looking for bad things,' the answer is no and I think that's probably the right answer," she said.

"But Parliament has to act."