As military probes deadly crash, clues could lie in the Cyclone's troubled procurement history - Action News
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As military probes deadly crash, clues could lie in the Cyclone's troubled procurement history

It took more than a dozen years to bring the Cyclone helicopter into service with the RCAF and some of its troubled history now casts a long shadow over the recent crash that killed six members of the military.

The one-of-a-kind military helicopter has had a cloud hanging over it for most of its history

Ground crew store a military helicopter on the deck of a frigate.
Master Cpl. Scott Galbraith signals the air crew to put a Cyclone CH-148 helicopter's blades in place aboard HMCS Fredericton during Operation Reassurance on Jan. 30, 2020. (Cpl. Simon Arcand/Canadian Armed Forces/Combat Camera)

As the tragic events in the Ionian Sea off Greece came into focus last week, a sense of dread rippled through a tight-knit community of former military and political staffers people whose careers have intersected with the long, troubled effort to bring the CH-148 Cyclone helicopter into service.

Texts and emails were exchanged.One from a former defence officialsimply read: "Gutted."

It was more than an expressionof remorse over the young lives shockinglycut short ona spring afternoon half a world away. Itwas an articulation of exasperation.

The bane of two governments before last week's crash claimed six lives, the Cyclone helicopter was the defence procurementprogram that came within a whisker of being cancelled the subject of high corporate and backroom political drama and hand-wringing among engineers and safety experts.

'Worst procurement in the history of Canada'

The Cyclone was chosen to replace the air force's five-decade-old CH-124 Sea Kings; its procurementwas considered by many in Ottawa to be a textbook example of what not to do when buying equipment. It drew the wrath of one auditor general and received the title of "worst procurement in the history of Canada" from Peter MacKay, the former Conservative defence minister.

Both civilian and military leadershave underlined the fact thatthe crash'scause remains unknown and that a thoroughinvestigation which could take more than a year will be needed to determine why a reasonably new helicopter (five years old) went down without warning.

victims of crash
Six military members were killed in last week's Cyclone crash. Clockwise from top left: Capt. Kevin Hagen, Sub-Lt. Abbigail Cowbrough, Capt. Brenden Ian MacDonald, Master Cpl. Matthew Cousins, Sub-Lt. Matthew Pyke, Capt. Maxime Miron-Morin. (Department of National Defence)

The investigators have to be given "all the room and authority to proceed" at their own pace, Gen. Jonathan Vance, chief of the defence staff, said Thursday.

But there are key facts about the aircraft and the decisions made regarding it that Canadians should understand as that investigation unfolds.

For starters:the Cyclone is a one-of-a-kind.

A 'developmental' aircraft

Based upon the Sikorsky S-92 civilian helicopter, it is for all intents and purposes a "developmental" helicopter. That aspect came in for heavy criticismfrom then-auditor general Sheila Fraser in 2010, who suggested Paul Martin's Liberal government misrepresented it as an established, proven design when the contract was first signed in 2004.

It's one of the reasons why bringing the helicopter into servicetook more than a dozen years and billions of extra dollars. The original 2004 budget for the Cyclone's procurementwas $3.2 billion, which had ballooned to $5.7 billion a decade later when consideration was given to scrapping the program.

Masked military pallbearers carry the casket of Sub-Lt. Abbigail Cowbrough during a repatriation ceremony for the six Canadian Forces personnel killed in a military helicopter crash in the Mediterranean, amid the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, at Canadian Forces Base in Trenton, Ontario, Canada May 6, 2020. (Frank Gunn/The Canadian Press)

At a point early in the process, Stephen Harper's Conservative government was startled to learnit would have to spend an extra $117 million onthe development of a more powerful engine to lift an aircraft that had been hardened to military standards.

"The key point here is that the Cyclone is a developmental aircraft," said Michael Byers, a University of British Columbia defence policy analystwho has written reports and articles critical of the maritime helicopter program.

Fly-by-wire

Is there something in the design of the aircraft or in the software that operates it that may have gone wrong last week?

Unlike the Sea Kingit replaced, the Cyclone runs on a "fly-by-wire" (FBW) design. It replaces conventional mechanical flight controls with electronic ones basically, computers that order the flight control surfaces to move based on the input from pilots.

"The Cyclone is a 21st century military aircraft and it is flown mostly by computers, fly by wire, and the electronic suite is extremely advanced," said Byers.

"The pilot's instructions are conveyed electronically. It's a modern aircraft. Obviously, the risk of mechanical failures are reduced but with that the risk of some kind of electronic interference or computer failure goes up."

Fly-by-wire technology has been the industry standard for both commercial and military aviation for a quarter century, but it's not without its problems. Its use (or perhaps misuse) was a major factor in the 2009 crash of Air France Flight 447, which killed all 228 passengers and crew.

In this Monday, June 8, 2009 file photo released by Brazil's Air Force, Brazil's Navy sailors recover debris from the missing Air France Flight 447 in the Atlantic Ocean. (Brazil air force/AP)

Fly-by-wirecontrols the pitch and movements of the aircraft, sometimes without pilot intervention.

Seven years ago, the software that runs the Cyclone was at the centre of a bitter dispute between the former Conservative government and the manufacturer, Sikorsky Aircraft (which is now owned by U.S. defence giant Lockheed Martin).

The argument involved the company's demand to deliver the operating system in phases,or "blocks",as they are known in the industry.

The government, threatening to cancel the deal, wanted a fully "mission ready" aircraftbut eventually settled for delivery in two blocks. The Department of National Defence said the helicopter that crashed received its softwareupgradein 2018.

'Non-compliant'

Concerns about the flight computer systemwent beyond the software, however.

In the summer of 2013, air force flight safety officials declared four test Cyclones "non-compliant," citing the possibilitythat delicate flight systems, including the computer that runs the engines, were not sufficiently shielded against powerful electromagnetic (EM) waves, such as those produced by military-grade radar on frigates.

A report by The Canadian Pressat the timequoted multiple sources at the air base in Shearwater, N.S., saying EM interference had the potential to blankout the digital instruments even to shutdown the engines.

In 2013, the directorate of airworthiness at the Department of National Defence issued a restricted flight certificate and imposed limits on the helicopter's operations specifically because of so-called "E-3" concerns electromagnetic compatibility, electromagnetic vulnerability and electromagnetic interference.

At the time, the problem was considered a potential "show-stopping" design flaw, but a source who was intimately involved in the file who spoketoCBC News this week insisted that the concerns were rectified without having to go through a major redesign of the airframe.

If pilot error is ruled out in last week's crash, and if there are concerns about either the flight control software or the adequacy of the design, Byers said the Liberal government could find itself facing a horrible dilemma.

"I'm not suggesting that is likely to happen, but with any developmental aircraft, you risk discovering a fundamental problem that is integral to the aircraft," he said.

"In a worst-case scenario, you quite literally have to start again."