Interview with Ukrainian People's Deputy and Committee of Foreign Affairs Member, Svitlana Zalishchuk

Since the 2004 Orange Revolution, the generational gap between young, pro-European civil society activists and Ukrainian government officials who spent their formative years under Communist rule has emerged as one of the most salient cleavages in Ukrainian politics. As Ukraine struggles to combat corruption and advance the cause of European integration in the post-Maidan era, the rise of Orange Revolution-era civil society activists and liberal journalists to political power has increased the prominence of voices of radical reform.

To gain a better understanding of the perspectives of and policy prescriptions advocated by this younger generation of officials, I interviewed Ukrainian Peoples Deputy and Committee of Foreign Affairs member, Svitlana Zalishchuk, at the University of Oxford, on January 24, 2017. Before entering Ukrainian politics, Zalishchuk was a human rights activist for numerous leading Kiev-based NGOs, and a journalist at Fifth Channel, the only independent Ukrainian TV channel during the Orange Revolution.

One of the most significant issues Ukraine faces is containing the impact of the security breakdown in Donbas. Since the outbreak of war in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, Donbas has become the site of Europes worst illegal arms proliferation crisis since the 1990s Yugoslavian civil wars.

In our interview, Zalishchuk acknowledged this problem and admitted that Ukrainian policymakers were concerned that illegal arms were causing an increase in criminal activity in Ukraine. Even though illegal arms sales can be profitable, Zalishchuk refuted the notion that the Ukrainian government was complicit in illegal arms proliferation and emphasized that salaries for Ukrainian military personnel had increased substantially since 2014. As many Ukrainians have joined the military voluntarily due to higher salaries, Zalishchuk argues that the military is not institutionally facilitating illegal arms proliferation in Ukraine for economic gain.

For the security situation in Donbas to improve, however, Ukraine needs to convince Russia to desist from ceasefire violations, which continue to inflame the conflict. Many notable Ukrainian political figures, like ex-President Leonid Kravchuk, have argued that diplomacy with Moscow is necessary for a durable resolution to the Ukraine conflict.

Zalishchuks views on short-term diplomacy with Russia are more pessimistic. She insists that progress can only be made if Russia becomes a democratic state. In the current context of an authoritarian Russia, durable diplomacy is impossible.

Zalishchuks skepticism about the possibility of a diplomatic settlement with Moscow is rooted in her interpretation of Putin-led Russias strategy to establish a new world order and to secure its legitimate sphere of interests in the post-Soviet area. Ukraines ability to resist this plan was undermined by institutionalized favor-trading between Ukrainian presidential administrations and Kremlin policymakers over the last two decades.

As Ukraine embraced a swinging foreign policy under Kuchma, Zalishchuk argues that Kiev underestimated Russias commitment to Eurasian integration and did not take appropriate steps to secure Ukraines integration with Europe. However, now that Ukraine has proclaimed its strategic goal to enter the EU and NATO, she believes that if Ukraine continues to follow the European development model, the incompatibility between its liberal values and Russias authoritarian system will be too stark for a reconciliation to take place.

To promote political liberalization in Russia, Zalishchuk acknowledges that Ukrainian politicians maintain links to Russian liberal politicians, even though Russias weak civil society ensures that the ability of these activists to assert their opinions is even more restricted than in Viktor Yanukovychs Ukraine. While liberal activists struggle to spread their message within Russia, Zalishchuk refuses to rule out the prospect of regime change, as pro-democracy movements have been able to mobilize hundreds of thousands of protesters on Russias streets.

This capacity for mass mobilization suggests that Putins 90% approval ratings are likely inflated. Therefore, Zalishchuk believes that mass unrest triggered by a tipping point event could cause Russias authoritarian system to suddenly unravel like another seemingly impregnable dictatorship, Nicolae Ceausescus Romania, collapsed in 1989.

Until Russia experiences this liberal transition, the Ukrainian government needs to reduce its dependency on Russia to ensure its sovereignty is protected. Zalishchuk notes that Ukraine has made considerable progress towards asserting its independence from Russia, by reforming its foreign service and removing Soviet-style features of Ukraines security forces that leave Kiev beholden to the Kremlin.

Cleansing Ukraines political institutions of pro-Russian spies and Russian allies has also increased political freedom in Ukraine, as Kiev no longer bans Russian activists who criticize politically sensitive Kremlin policies like the Chechen wars. Parliamentary reforms have also increased Ukraines international profile. Zalishchuk notes that Ukrainian parliamentary delegations are multi-lingual and much more effectively assert Ukrainian interests in PACE, NATO and the OSCE, than in the past.

The creation of a professional parliamentary delegation has facilitated Ukraines ability to forge durable cooperation with the EU at the economic, security, intelligence and cultural levels. This success contrasts markedly with Ukraines previous indecisiveness between alignment with Russia and the EU, and shows that Ukrainian parliamentarians have addressed the linguistic barriers and unprofessional conduct that hampered past missions.

Turning to the socioeconomic situation in Ukraine, we discussed Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenkos policies towards one of Ukraines most intractable problems: emigration. In our interview, Zalishchuk acknowledged that the Ukrainian government has not done enough to address youth emigration from Ukraine.

For this problem to be confronted, Ukraine needs to implement sweeping anti-corruption reforms, as reducing corruption will facilitate small business creation, and the emergence of startups. Zalishchuk notes that while some Ukrainians are willing to be patient and wait for political reform; others are unwilling to wait for 10 years but instead are looking for radical change in a 2-3 year time horizon. If these aspiring businesspeople see little change in the political environment, they are likely to continue to leave in large numbers.

We concluded our interview by discussing the state of Ukrainian democracy. One major criticism of Poroshenkos democratic consolidation efforts is that his government has not created a safe space for pro-Russian journalists to freely express their political views. To address this criticism, Zalishchuk argues that it is necessary to separate useful Ukrainian government legislation, like travel restrictions to Russian-occupied Crimea and crackdowns on Russian journalists who travel to Ukraine at the behest of Kremlin-aligned employers, from isolated incidences of violence against journalists.

If this distinction is made, Ukraines crackdown on Russian influence is justifiable and should not be seen as an impediment to democracy. Zalishchuk notes that Ukraines imposition of sanctions against Russian officials involved in the annexation of Crimea has received broad-based international support, without compromising political freedom in Ukraine.

As the Russian annexation of Crimea was preceded by the Russian states purchases of properties, investments in media and systematic bribery of local officials, limiting the infiltration of pro-Kremlin forces into Ukraine is a matter of national security. Zalishchuk argues that the Ukrainian governments inaction against these developments and unresponsiveness to repeated predictions of a possible Russian annexation of Crimea enabled Russian aggression.

Another point of criticism of Ukrainian democracy is the rise of personality-driven political parties. Zalishchuk acknowledges this trend in Ukrainian politics, and notes that she herself is affiliated with both the Democratic Alliance Party and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc. Ukraines ability to reform its party system is hampered by the disappearance of parties after leaders retire from politics. However, Zalishchuk believes that Ukraine is taking steps to promote ideological competition between parties, at a time when the United States and Europe are experiencing a revival of personality-driven populist movements.

Even though Poroshenko has taken many tangible steps towards resolving Ukraines socioeconomic challenges and steering Ukraine on the path towards European integration, many barriers still exist to durable political change in Ukraine. The initiatives supported by Zalishchuk and other Orange Revolution generation Ukrainian officials provide grounds for optimism about Ukraines political future, during a period of economic malaise and profound uncertainty in Kiev.

Samuel Ramani is a DPhil candidate in International Relations at St. Antonys College, University of Oxford. He is also a journalist who writes regularly for the Washington Post and Diplomat magazine. He can be followed on Twitter at samramani2 and on Facebook at Samuel Ramani.