The Iran Deal is in America's National Security Interests

Bailing out of the Iran Deal will have profound implications for American foreign policy. Such a shortsighted move would further diminish the U.S. Governments influence and credibility, damage its relations among the major powers, and destabilize the Middle East. Further, it would jeopardize the global effort to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, especially at a time when the Trump administration is trying to rollback North Koreas nuclear program.

Were living through a time in American politics where every foreign policy decision is viewed through a partisan prism, evaluated by scoring political points instead of advancing U.S. national security interests. And so, before the ink was even dry on this deal, a majority of Republicans have declared their virulent opposition without care for the ramifications it could prevent world-wide.

Republican opponents of the comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), argue that the U.S. should withdraw and renegotiate for a better deal. They advocate tighter restrictions, longer duration, and more robust inspection and verification provisions, including full Iranian cooperation to resolve the Possible Military Dimensions issue, and anytime, anywhere challenge inspections.

Truth is, the Iran Deal would allow inspectors daily access to Irans key nuclear sites. If there is a reason for inspecting a suspicious, undeclared site anywhere in Iran, inspectors will get that access, even if Iran objects. The prohibition on Iran having a nuclear weapon is permanent. The ban on weapons-related research is also permanent. It is true that some of the limitations regarding Irans peaceful program will last only 15 years. But thats how arms control agreements work, and theres diplomatic space, in the future, to negotiate an extension or follow-on agreement.

Under the deal, Iran will lose 97 percent of its stockpile of enriched uranium. It will also give up 14,000 of its 20,000 centrifuges - the machines used to enrich uranium - and agree to only enrich uranium to a level unsuitable for weapons for 15 years.

The deal also curbs Iranian production of plutonium, the other element that can be used to build a bomb. The deal bans plutonium reactors for 15 years and stipulates that Iran must dismantle its current one.

Theres a growing recognition within the U.S. policy community that the deal is would benefit Americas security and that of our allies. It imposes powerful constraints on Irans ability to quickly amass a stockpile of fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Additionally, it includes an inspections regime perhaps more rigorous than any other. And it pays for all of that with Irans own money.

Most importantly, the JCPOA is effectively verifiable. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has verified that Iran has implemented its key nuclear-related measures described by JCPOA, and the United States has confirmed the IAEAs verification. How can countries like North Korea ever take U.S. arms control efforts seriously if Trump recklessly rejects an agreement that works?

Not only is Iran opposed to renegotiating, U.S. allies and partners are as well. Proposals to reject the current agreement, sustain sanctions and negotiate a better deal are highly risky. If the United States unilaterally rejects a deal that the rest of the P5+1 and the worlds other leading economic powers support, the coalition the U.S. painstakingly built to pressure Iran would likely unravel, and much of the global sanctions effort, beyond just U.S. sanctions, would crumble with it. U.S. rejection of the JCPOA would discredit Iranian leaders who have advocated compromise, enable Iran to blame the U.S. for walking away from a diplomatic settlement, and hobble U.S. efforts to retain, much less intensify, the existing sanctions regime. Thus, the U.S. would be left with less leverage, while Iran would have more freedom to advance its nuclear program.It is important to recall that in 2012 Iran was reportedly on the brink of obtaining a nuclear weapon in a matter of months. President Barack Obama made it clear that his policy was not containment of a nuclear Iran, but to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. After a divisive and exhausting reelection campaign, even conservatives recognized that the most urgent matter on the U.S. foreign policy agenda was how to stop Iran from pursuing a military nuclear program. That is precisely what the negotiations did: develop a verifiable nuclear arms control agreement that also reaffirms and strengthens Irans obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Iran remains an enduring threat to US national interests because of Iranian support to anti-US terrorist groups and militants, the Asad regime, Huthi rebels in Yemen, and Irans development of advanced military capabilities. The Obama administration was clear that the nuclear deal did not give Iran a pass for its nefarious activities. It maintained a long litany of non-nuclear domestic and international sanctions, and continued to enforce them while beefing up military and intelligence cooperation with our Gulf allies. But President Obama also concluded that these same nefarious activities would be far more dangerous, and difficult to confront, if they were carried out under an Iranian nuclear umbrella.

If President Trump is serious about preserving Americas national security interests, then he should offer an Iranian strategy, one that continues to implement the JCPOA and offers to do more to help Gulf allies battle Iranian proxies in the region. More should be done to restrain Iranian influence, particularly Irans capacity to sponsor terror, and impose financial sanctions to deprive Irans leaders of money that funds the patronage networks that are essential to their rule and imperial ventures while holding Iran accountable for its dismal human rights record, as well as its support for terrorism. Most importantly, Trump should preserve the JCPOA, not only for its merits, but for the platform it creates for dialogue with Iran. The United States Government has fundamental differences with Iran, but the way to close the distance of distrust is through diplomacy.

Looking into the future, the deal, and the resulting increased integration of Irans economy with the rest of the world, are likely to strengthen moderate political factions in Iran. This could moderate Irans behavior, or create increased opportunities for cooperation in other areas where Western and Iranian interests overlap (such as the fight against the Islamic State).

If President Trump decides to dump the JCPOA, the result would be an essentially uncontrollable military nuclear proliferation throughout a region roiled by revolution and sectarian blood-feuds. As a consequence, each nation that has a nuclear option would compete to minimize the time it takes for its own full military nuclear capability. Meanwhile, countries within the reach of Irans military, but lacking a nuclear option, would be driven to reorient their political alignment toward Tehran. The reformist tendencies in the Arab Spring already under severe pressure would be submerged by this process. Americas longstanding efforts toward a global reduction of nuclear weapons would suffer a blow, perhaps a fatal one.

Earlier this year, in a significant departure from Republican Party orthodoxy that has decried the Iranian nuclear deal, Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Corker said the Trump administration ought to let the deal remain: In spite of all of the flaws in the agreement, nothing bad is going to happen relative to the nuclear development in Iran over the next few years. Its just not, he said. If Iran complies, the JCPOA buys at least 10 to 15 years before Tehran can restart and significantly expand its nuclear capabilities. If Iran cheats during this period, JCPOA monitoring and national intelligence are likely to detect major violations, which would enhance U.S. and international options to intensify sanctions and take military action, if necessary. If the agreement survives after 15 years, the terms can be extended.

Without the deal, Iran might be two to three months away from getting a nuclear bomb. With the deal, Iran commits to not pursuing nuclear weapons overall and faces serious verifiable obstacles if it seeks to break its commitment and pursue a nuclear weapon.